No votes yet — be the first!Score: 0
❤️ 0
👍 0
🔧 0
👎 0
💀 0
Vote totals refresh periodically.
How difficult is this puzzle?
No difficulty ratings yet.
Comments (15)
Anonymous
2 July 2007
I think I have an alternative and better solution to the Pirates problem. The original problem is that five pirates have obtained 100 gold coins and have to divide up the loot.
Anonymous
8 December 2008
If pirates 1 and 3 vote against the captain, then the Captain gets mutinied, and a new redistribution is proposed. Why would they be content to get simply one coin?
Anonymous
8 December 2008
In the '100 Gold Coins' puzzle, if pirates 1 and 3 vote against the captain, then the captain gets mutinied, and a new redistribution is proposed. Why would they be content to get simply one coin?
Anonymous
6 March 2010
hello,
i have a proposition for question (2.), `100 Gold Coins`: knowing that two of the pirates get nothing and two of them get each 1 coin, what if one of the pirates which gets 1 coin will not vote `Aye` for the captain, knowing that the other two who gets nothing won`t be pleased and won`t vote `Aye`, either ? in the statement there is never mentioned that the captain will kill any of the pirates who dare not vote for his proposal. so now there will be three against two, the captain and the other pirate will be overpowered and thrown overboard, and will remain only 3 pirates to split the money.
well .. i want to propose another solution which will surely get the captain with most of the money, without risking any mutiny.
the amount of money that will get each of the pirate if the sum will be split equally, is 20 coins/pirate. the captain will give to two of them 20 coins each, assuring himself that they won`t be losing anything either way, and then, he will take the rest of the sum, meaning 60 coins.
Anonymous
6 March 2010
Knowing that two of the pirates get nothing and two of them get each 1 coin, what if one of the pirates which gets 1 coin will not vote Aye for the captain, knowing that the other two who get nothing won’t be pleased and won’t vote Aye, either?
Anonymous
6 March 2010
The reasoning in '100 Gold Coins' seems faulty. If one pirate who receives 1 coin does not vote 'Aye', the captain and the other pirate could be outvoted, leading to a different distribution of coins.
Anonymous
4 October 2010
The 100 Gold coins honestly doesn't make sense. If the captain was to take 98 gold coins and give 1 to two other members, wouldn't the members just fight back? Honestly who would want just one coin?
Anonymous
4 October 2010
The 100 Gold Coins puzzle doesn't make sense. If the captain takes 98 gold coins and gives 1 to two other members, wouldn't they just fight back? They are all greedy, so they would likely mutinize and split the coins evenly instead.
Anonymous
10 November 2010
The language in the 100 Gold Coins problem is confusing and requires clarification to improve understanding.
Anonymous
27 July 2015
If there were 2 pirates, pirate 2 being the most senior, he would just vote for himself and that would be 50% of the vote, so he's obviously going to keep all the money for himself. If there were 3 pirates, pirate 3 has to convince at least one other person to join in his plan.
Anonymous
27 July 2015
The voting strategy for the pirates seems flawed. If pirate 1 knows he can get nothing if he doesn't vote for pirate 3, wouldn't he also consider the possibility of a better deal if he waits for pirate 2's plan?
Anonymous
8 January 2018
I suggest that the given solution fails to take into consideration that all the pirates are intelligent and treacherous. Were I the next senior pirate, I would promise the three lower grade pirates that if they would reject the Captain's proposal and make him walk the plank, then I, as the new acting Captain would share the 100 coins evenly among the remaining.
Anonymous
7 February 2018
The logic is flawed. If (for instance) there were 3 pirates, and the captain proposes that he keeps 99 and gives 1 to Pirate 1, you claim that Pirate 1 would agree to this because it's better than the alternative (getting nothing). But it isn't true; because the alternative is making the Captain walking the plank and splitting the 100 coins with Pirate 2, 50-50.
Anonymous
7 February 2018
The logic is flawed. If there were 3 pirates, and the captain proposes that he keeps 99 and gives 1 to Pirate 1, Pirate 1 would not agree because the alternative is making the Captain walk the plank and splitting the 100 coins with Pirate 2, 50-50.
Anonymous
7 February 2018
The logic in '100 Gold Coins' is flawed. For example, if there were 3 pirates, the captain's proposal of keeping 99 coins and giving 1 to Pirate 1 isn't necessarily better than the alternative of making the captain walk the plank and splitting the coins with Pirate 2.
Comments (15)
I think I have an alternative and better solution to the Pirates problem. The original problem is that five pirates have obtained 100 gold coins and have to divide up the loot.
If pirates 1 and 3 vote against the captain, then the Captain gets mutinied, and a new redistribution is proposed. Why would they be content to get simply one coin?
In the '100 Gold Coins' puzzle, if pirates 1 and 3 vote against the captain, then the captain gets mutinied, and a new redistribution is proposed. Why would they be content to get simply one coin?
hello,
i have a proposition for question (2.), `100 Gold Coins`:
knowing that two of the pirates get nothing and two of them get each 1 coin, what if one of the pirates which gets 1 coin will not vote `Aye` for the captain, knowing that the other two who gets nothing won`t be pleased and won`t vote `Aye`, either ?
in the statement there is never mentioned that the captain will kill any of the pirates who dare not vote for his proposal.
so now there will be three against two, the captain and the other pirate will be overpowered and thrown overboard, and will remain only 3 pirates to split the money.
well .. i want to propose another solution which will surely get the captain with most of the money, without risking any mutiny.
the amount of money that will get each of the pirate if the sum will be split equally, is 20 coins/pirate. the captain will give to two of them 20 coins each, assuring himself that they won`t be losing anything either way, and then, he will take the rest of the sum, meaning 60 coins.
Knowing that two of the pirates get nothing and two of them get each 1 coin, what if one of the pirates which gets 1 coin will not vote Aye for the captain, knowing that the other two who get nothing won’t be pleased and won’t vote Aye, either?
The reasoning in '100 Gold Coins' seems faulty. If one pirate who receives 1 coin does not vote 'Aye', the captain and the other pirate could be outvoted, leading to a different distribution of coins.
The 100 Gold coins honestly doesn't make sense. If the captain was to take 98 gold coins and give 1 to two other members, wouldn't the members just fight back? Honestly who would want just one coin?
The 100 Gold Coins puzzle doesn't make sense. If the captain takes 98 gold coins and gives 1 to two other members, wouldn't they just fight back? They are all greedy, so they would likely mutinize and split the coins evenly instead.
The language in the 100 Gold Coins problem is confusing and requires clarification to improve understanding.
If there were 2 pirates, pirate 2 being the most senior, he would just vote for himself and that would be 50% of the vote, so he's obviously going to keep all the money for himself. If there were 3 pirates, pirate 3 has to convince at least one other person to join in his plan.
The voting strategy for the pirates seems flawed. If pirate 1 knows he can get nothing if he doesn't vote for pirate 3, wouldn't he also consider the possibility of a better deal if he waits for pirate 2's plan?
I suggest that the given solution fails to take into consideration that all the pirates are intelligent and treacherous. Were I the next senior pirate, I would promise the three lower grade pirates that if they would reject the Captain's proposal and make him walk the plank, then I, as the new acting Captain would share the 100 coins evenly among the remaining.
The logic is flawed. If (for instance) there were 3 pirates, and the captain proposes that he keeps 99 and gives 1 to Pirate 1, you claim that Pirate 1 would agree to this because it's better than the alternative (getting nothing). But it isn't true; because the alternative is making the Captain walking the plank and splitting the 100 coins with Pirate 2, 50-50.
The logic is flawed. If there were 3 pirates, and the captain proposes that he keeps 99 and gives 1 to Pirate 1, Pirate 1 would not agree because the alternative is making the Captain walk the plank and splitting the 100 coins with Pirate 2, 50-50.
The logic in '100 Gold Coins' is flawed. For example, if there were 3 pirates, the captain's proposal of keeping 99 coins and giving 1 to Pirate 1 isn't necessarily better than the alternative of making the captain walk the plank and splitting the coins with Pirate 2.
Add a Comment or Suggest an Answer